Fall of the West

Elections may no longer matter, given the adverse social trends already in place


A Trump victory over Biden in the US election on November 3 would be worth celebrating, as it probably would make a significant positive difference in the lives of Americans over the next few years, in comparison to the alternative. But in the long run—in the the grand scheme of things—I really don’t see this election making much of a difference. There are trends ongoing that will determine the USA’s fate, and I think the West’s fate generally, to a much greater extent than individual elections can.

These trends are adverse trends—pathologies that have festered for decades beneath this civilization’s glittering exterior. They are not all that complicated or difficult to describe. No doubt, people will make money writing lengthy books about them anyway—or pensées on Substack. But I think they can be described adequately in not much more space than a newspaper op-ed takes.

I list them in no particular order. They are all important and mutually reinforcing:

Purchased voters: Also known as “people who vote for a living.” Their primary interest is not to see that the country is well run, but to keep the handouts coming. In the US this disease to which democracy is always prone became inevitable once the country began to acquire a proportionately large number of voters (via immigration or extensions of voting rights) who had roots in parts of the world lacking European-level work ethics and other behavioral norms. In fact, one of the two main American political parties has been building itself around this indigent constituency since the Civil Rights days of the 1960s—and what started as a political strategy to capture the votes of American blacks now encompasses myriad ethnically and culturally defined groups. In Europe there have been similar trends focusing on relatively unemployed immigrants from the Middle East and Africa.

Feminization of culture and politics: Women’s “liberation” from traditional, mostly home-based, maternal roles has meant not only that women can vote, but also that they can enter (and in some cases dominate) culturally influential professions such as journalism, politics, and law. Women on average think differently from men on a range of policy issues, with an evident bias towards more compassionate-seeming policies, and a relative aversion to policies, speech, and situations that may cause emotional upsets. In short, compared to men, they tend to be more easily swayed by sob stories, and tend to feel more threatened by free speech, due process of law, and other freewheeling, confrontational Western traditions developed by males. These feminine policy biases, which may principally reflect maternal instincts—misdirected outward into the policy arena—are most evident in single women, who become proportionately more numerous in the West every year under the influence of feminism. The result has been a strong cultural and political shift that in turn drives Western societies to adopt policies, such as generous welfare, reverse discrimination, and open immigration, that powerfully erode the central “Western” features of these societies.

Mass non-European immigration: This has been one of the most prominent and pervasive trends in Western societies for the past 40 years, and by definition it de-Westernizes the societies where it occurs. As it scales up, it also encourages Western politics to become polarized between legacy-population and non-legacy population parties, and in general tends to stoke ethnic-based factionalism. I happen to think that the smarter, harder-working nonwhite ethnicities (principally East and South Asians, in the US) ultimately will dominate all others in these countries, and though they may continue certain Western traditions, their policies as they acquire more power will increasingly reflect their own, ancient, non-European heritages.

Depression and infertility: Feminism, and anti-male (especially white male) discrimination in the countries (e.g., USA) where it exists, have reduced the marriage rate, and the growth in living standards for the legacy population of the West. I guess at least partly for these two reasons, and perhaps also because there has been a striking decline in testosterone levels in Western males, the legacy population of the West now has low overall fertility and appears to be in terminal decline—overall population increases from year to year essentially are due to the influx of immigrants and their higher birthrates. The sense of moral dislocation that comes from postmodern liberalism, feminism’s particular unmooring of many women from their traditional lifeway centered on maternity, and the sense of being a disfavored stranger in one’s own immigrant-filled country, also may be contributing to depression, drug addiction, obesity, and other “diseases of despair” afflicting the West’s legacy population.

What I think all this means is that, barring some extreme development that results in the mass expatriation of non-Europeans from the West, the curbing of Western women’s cultural and political power, and a major increase in Western marriage rates and fertility, Western societies are destined simply to become more and more non-European/Western in their populations and cultures. This may be a gradual and mostly non-violent process. Even so, from the perspective of a century or two from now, it is likely to be seen as what it was: the Fall of the West.